The Dual Meaning of Meaning :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

A central problem in the philosophy of language has been to find a way to reconcile scratch line person authority about meaning with externalist theories of meaning. In other words, if meanings arent wholly in the head (the externalist thesis), then how do we excuse the apparent authority we have about what our own utterances mean? In this paper, I will present one possible and, I believe, highly believable solution which will allow us to agree that we do have first person authority with regard to the meanings of our utterances while still accepting the lessons that couple up Earth has taught us (that meanings are, at least in part, determined by the external world). Moreover, it is, I believe, a virtue of any philosophical opening that it abide as close to common sense as analytical rigour will allow. Thus, it is advisable that one try to approach philosophical questions as the layperson still untainted by philosophy would approach them. This brand of common sense phil osophy is what I shall attempt to use in providing an account of meaning. Let us begin, then, by examining first person authority. It seems quite obvious to me that, should there be no successful reconciliation of first person authority with externalism, the former would defeat the latter in any theory of meaning. I do not say this just because it is highly counter-intuitive to think that we dont generally know what we mean when we speak, rather it seems to me to be unattainable to deny that we have this knowledge not only do we know what we mean, but we know that we know what we mean. Though most philosophers recognise the obviousness of this fact, some11 maintain that it is in need of an explanation. This, I believe, is because they take externalism as more primitive than first person authority. What I mean is that these philosophers approach first person authority from the bandstand of an already developed externalist theory. I suggest that, instead, we take the undeniabili ty of first person authority as given and then attempt to provide a theory of meaning that preserves first person authority while accounting for the role of the external world in determining meaning. What exactly is it, then, of which we have this result authoritative knowledge? And how, if at all, does it relate to the external world?